



(Mobile book) The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama

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Michael R. Gordon, Bernard E. Trainor
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THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ, FROM
GEORGE W. BUSH TO BARACK OBAMA



#127069 in Books Michael R Gordon 2013-03-12 2013-03-12 Original language: English PDF # 1 9.20 x 1.60 x 6.10l, 2.21 #File Name: 0307388948832 pages The Endgame The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq from George W Bush to Barack Obama | File size: 46.Mb

Michael R. Gordon, Bernard E. Trainor : The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama:

5 of 5 people found the following review helpful. Behind the scenes look at post-invasion Iraq By J. Soubra My personal recollection of post-invasion Iraq consisted of an impressionistic patchwork of news reports on bombings, IED and suicide attacks, political debates, and opinion pieces. I didn't feel that I had a very coherent understanding of how we really got from point A to B in Iraq. I think most military history enthusiasts understand that there is some period of time required for the dust to sufficiently settle from historic events to allow the conscientious historian to assemble the facts (and opinions) behind something as chaotic as war and present a more pragmatic version of events. This book provided exactly what I look for in a historical record, with an incredible amount of behind-the-scenes information from interviews of the key players and declassified (and classified?) documentation, enabling me to form that coherent vision. I noticed some reviews criticize the book because they disagree with the authors' opinions expressed throughout the book. Personally, I don't care if the authors express their opinion as it is done here, in a non-heavy handed way and without disrupting the narrative. The key to this book is that the reporting of the history gives you sufficient, factual information to enable the reader to feel confident in forming his own opinion of events and actions, and contrast it to the authors. If you can't accept a book where the author's opinion differs from your own, just go to a book store and read the Epilogue which summarizes the authors' thoughts on the management of post-invasion Iraq and you might save a few bucks.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. The End Game and Beginning and Middle Too By H. P. Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them. --T.E. Lawrence Title notwithstanding, The End Game starts from the beginning. The early stuff has been covered elsewhere before, but is appreciated nonetheless. In particular, The End Game is focused on the colonels and generals, rather than, as most of the books on the subject I've read, the highest military brass and civilian leadership. We get the disaster of Bremer (he basically scuttled the entire Iraqi infrastructure, but never seriously invested in replacing it). In fact, the entire early war effort is a tragedy of errors. Casey was another disaster. He completely focused on a drawdown, when more and more evidence was pointing to its futility and the potential of counterinsurgency (a counterinsurgency strategy (under the guise of an ink blot strategy) was put forward as many as 16 months before the surge). Gordon and Trainor make a convincing case that our strategy was a failure even before Samarra blew the powder keg. We faced two serious problems. Sunni insurgent attacks led to Shiite Iraqis terrorizing Sunni Iraqis, often using the arm of the state. That opened the door for Al Qaeda to wage war directly against the Americans in Iraq. It's always been fascinating to see the slow progress from virtually full support for a drawdown to the conclusion that the full surge, not simply a small increase. Petraeus had been pushing counterinsurgency, but it was viewed with great skepticism by his superiors. President Bush may have boldly accepted a large surge, but it was the generals on the ground who set the strategy for how the additional battalions would be used. The Sunni Awakening was one of the great surprises of the Iraq War. For all the arguments for the Surge, the effect of the Surge on the Awakening was not fully appreciated. The Awakening may have preceded the Surge, but the counterinsurgency tactics of the Surge took the Awakening out of Anbar. The Awakening started as a bottom-up phenomenon driven by local Iraqis and the American units they encountered in the field. It was not something the generals . . . had organized from on high. But recognized and appreciated, they were complementary and fed off each other. Sadly, this isn't a story with a happy ending. We see the political tail wagging the policy dog in an administration dominated by former Senators. Both militaries wanted a continued US military presence, but the politics for the politicians were much trickier on both sides. It was a fundamental error by both the Bush and Obama administrations to allow the Office of the Vice President greater influence than the State Department. The Office of the VP can never bring the kind of resources and infrastructure to bear that the State Department can. Despite the success of the surge, feckless decision making is leaving us back where we started before the surge. But then, I question whether, whatever the military success of the surge, we ever did the other things necessary to win. This review is of the Kindle edition. Just over 20% of the Kindle edition is devoted to reference material, etc., including acknowledgments, notes (hyperlinked both ways, and taking up 12% of the Kindle edition itself), index (hyperlinked), short bios of the authors, illustrations, maps and charts, and an also by.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Comprehensive and Accurate By Frank G. Gordon and Trainor's book is the best study - to date - of the military and political aspects of the war in Iraq. It is more than a standard history of military and diplomatic activities. It provides details of non-public meetings and decisions not only in coalition military headquarters throughout Iraq but also in the Presidential Palace in Baghdad's Green Zone and in the White House. And these details provide new and valuable insights into the successes and failures of the U.S. in Iraq from 2003 through 2012. Are the details accurate? I spent a year in Iraq and was present for a few of the meetings discussed in this book. To be clear, I wasn't sitting at the table - I was one of the persons sitting in a folding chair against the wall. In my opinion, the Gordon and Trainor version of these meetings is entirely accurate which increases my confidence that their other descriptions are accurate as well. If there is one substantial gap in this work, it is the decision to downplay the dramatic changes in the Iraqi economy during this period e.g. the political impact of the 2006 collapse in Iraqi government revenue. However, there are other recent works on the post-2003 Iraqi economy, so anyone interested can obtain an economic perspective on this period. Overall, I think that the greatest value of Gordon and Trainor's work is not as history but rather as a source of lessons learned - and maybe an exhortation to humility - for future U.S. military/diplomatic efforts in the Middle

East.

A Wall Street Journal Best Nonfiction Book of 2012 In this follow-up to their national bestseller *Cobra II*, Michael Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor deftly piece together the story of the most widely reported but least understood war in American history. This stunning account of the political and military struggle between American, Iraqi, and Iranian forces brings together vivid reporting of diplomatic intrigue and gripping accounts of the blow-by-blow fighting that lasted nearly a decade. Informed by brilliant research, classified documents, and extensive interviews with key figures including everyone from the intelligence community to Sunni and Shiite leaders and former insurgents to senior Iraqi military officers *The Endgame* presents a riveting chronicle of the occupation of Iraq to the withdrawal of American troops that is sure to remain the essential account of the war for years to come.

Praise for Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor's *The Endgame*: Likely to stand for decades as the definitive account of the Iraq war. . . . [A] tour de force of contemporary history. . . . The best tribute we can pay to the Iraq veterans is to remember what they did, and that is precisely the achievement of [*The Endgame*]. The Wall Street Journal Meticulous. . . . Persuasive. . . . Should be required reading. . . . Thanks to the authors extraordinary research and sobriety, the accumulation of one well-documented fact after another is compelling. . . . Regime change means not only getting rid of a bad regime but also finding a way to replace it with something better. *The Endgame* shows just how hard that process can be and, by implication, how crazy it is to start a war without good plans for how to finish it. The New York Times Ambitious. . . . A well-researched, highly critical look at U.S. policy in Iraq. . . . Ultimately, *The Endgame* invites the question whether President Obama threw his support behind the wrong war. Newsweek/The Daily Beast The devil of the story is in the details, and the authors do a superb job of providing them. . . . Likely to be considered definitive for some time to come. The Washington Times A solid chronicle of the Iraq War, emphasizing military maneuvers and Iraqi participation at all levels. . . . A deliberate, chronological construction of events. . . . A straightforward, evenhanded account of the nine-year slog that began as a war of choice and became a war of necessity. Kirkus sA fantastic book . . . highly anticipated and a must-read on this subject. Joe Scarborough, MSNBC's Morning Joe Gordon is considered by many to be the best reporter on the Iraq war . . . his long-awaited book is likely to shed new light particularly on the last half-decade of U.S. involvement. Foreign Policy An epic piece of work. Andrea Mitchell, MSNBC What Michael Gordon has written is correct. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari If you want to know about this painful and critical episode of American history, you have to read these books. James Rosen, Fox News Gordon and Trainor's most ambitious and news-breaking book to date. A peerless work of investigative journalism and historical recreation ranging from 2003 to 2012, it gives us the first comprehensive, inside account of arguably the most widely reported yet least understood war in American history. Frogen Yozurt Online Magazine About the Author Michael R. Gordon is the chief military correspondent for The New York Times, where he has worked since 1985. He is the coauthor, with Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, of *The Generals' War* and *Cobra II*. He has covered the Iraq and Afghan wars, the Kosovo conflict, the Russian war in Chechnya, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the American invasion of Panama. Bernard E. Trainor, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general, was a military correspondent for The New York Times from 1986 to 1990. He was director of the National Security Program at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government from 1990 to 1996 and was a military analyst for NBC during the Iraq War. Excerpt. Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved. Prologue No one book can capture an event as complex as a war, especially a nine-year war in a distant nation that from its outset was permeated by tribal, religious, ethnic, local, and regional politics. Nonetheless, this volume seeks to provide the most comprehensive account to date of the United States involvement in Iraq. From the start, our goal was to cover Iraq's halting political development as well as the military battles. We gave attention to decisions in Baghdad as well as Washington. And we covered the clashes and political maneuvering from the early days of the American-led occupation, through the descent into sectarian violence, the surge that pulled Iraq back from the brink of civil war, and the vexing aftermath. This was an ambitious project, but we have been covering the Iraq War from the start. Through two American presidents, a succession of Iraqi prime ministers, and a variety of United States commanders, we tracked events on the ground in Iraq and in Washington. We were present for many of the ferocious battles in Anbar, Diyala, Mosul, and Sadr City, and we covered the nation's political development. We saw American and Iraqi blood spilled, and we interacted with the generals, diplomats, and politicians on whose shoulders the decisions of the war rested. Too many American accounts of the war in Iraq have left out the Iraqis, or cast them as little more than a backdrop for dramas that were played out in Washington or among American commanders in Baghdad. But they are essential actors in their own nation's drama. For this reason, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and rivals like Ayad Allawi, Massoud Barzani, and Adil Abd al-Mahdi share the list of the hundreds of interviews we conducted along with Iraqi generals, police commanders, tribal sheikhs, and student protesters. We also interviewed myriad American and British generals, as well as officers and enlisted troops down to the platoon level. The objective was to weave together battles fought by the troops with closed-door Green Zone and White House meetings from the conflicts' earlier days through the military withdrawal in December 2011. More than that, we have sought to explain not just what happened when

and where, but why. We have been aided in our task by unprecedented access to classified documents that chronicle the war as it was seen from the American embassy in Baghdad, from the White House, from military headquarters across Iraq, and from the command posts of special operations and intelligence units. The troves of secret documents on which we were able to draw shed light on corners of the Iraq story that would otherwise have remained dark for years. Internal military and State Department reports have provided glimpses of roads not taken and opportunities missed. Firsthand after-action reports and cumulative briefings chart and bring to life the nighttime campaign waged in Iraq by the Joint Special Operations Command, the headquarters overseeing Americas most elite and secretive commando units, both against Sunni insurgents and later against Shiite militias and even the Quds Force, Irans operations and intelligence arm in Iraq. Still-classified oral histories show the war as commanders recounted it. CIA and other intelligence reports helped complete the mosaic. In painting a picture of Americas complicated struggle with Iran in Iraq, for instance, we have been able to draw on General David Petraeuss classified updates to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, an unauthorized disclosure that opens a window into the inner workings of the war and describes Petraeuss own third-party interactions with the leader of that force, Qasim Suleimani. Other documents provide rare glimpses of the war through the eyes of those who fought against the United States and the Iraqi government. Detailed reports on the interrogations of Qais and Laith al-Khazali, two Iraqi Shiite militants captured by the British Special Air Service in 2007, offer an inside view of Iraqs Sadrist political movement and militias and its ties to Iran. Transcripts of the interrogations of Sunni insurgents captured by American troops, along with internal reports by insurgent commanders recovered from hard drives and flash drives, have helped us understand the activities of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the local franchise of the global terrorist group that was the United States main antagonist for much of the war. Heavily classified embassy cables, internal Red Team analyses organized by the American military command, notes of critical meetings in Washington and Baghdad, and classified assessments and war plans commissioned by the generals who prosecuted the war round out our account. We have protected the intelligence communitys sources and methods. By combining extensive interviews with this documentary history, we have sought to convey a full and rich history of a tumultuous period that has put its stamp on the American military, has decisively altered the history of Iraq, and that will influence events in the broader Middle East for decades to come.