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before purchasing it in order to gauge whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised The Fall of the Turkish Model: How the Arab Uprisings Brought Down Islamic Liberalism:

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. An insightful book on the Turkish model By Qaisar Rashid, DrRevered by the world was a politically democratic and economically egalitarian Turkish model, which acquiesced

to political authoritarianism owing to certain changes introduced by the Arab Spring of 2011. This is the central idea of the book. In the title of the book, Tugal has equated the words Turkish model with Islamic liberalism. About the Turkish model, Tugal writes on page 4: [I]t was Islamic liberalism: marriage of formal democracy, free market capitalism and (a toned down) conservative Islam. Further, Tugal writes on page 20: [I]n the current era, liberalism, the apotheosis of individual property and freedom, frequently goes hand in hand with neoliberalisation (privatization of property, restructuring of welfare state to render individuals self-sufficient, and financialisation). Tracing the origin of the Turkish model, Tugal writes on page 25: What is today known as the Turkish model was perhaps finalized by the AKP regime [Adaletve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP), the liberal-conservative Justice and Development Party which came to power in Turkey in 2002], but its foundations were laid by a coup and its civilian extension in the 1980s, which in turn had come as responses to the turbulence of the 1970s. The reasons for AKPs popularity were two. First, the Islamic threat, as Tugal writes on page 4: The perception of the Islamic threat explains the warm reception of the AKP. Second, economic problems, as Tugal writes on page 8: [T]he AKP regimes success was an outcome of bottom-up entrepreneurial activity [characterized by politics-free business of small and medium size]. The incumbent President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan founded the AKP in 2001. Erdogans political ideals embodied in Erdoganism (i.e. a religiously inspired centralized leadership based on electoral consent) substitute Kemalism, which was implemented by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Yet, Erdoganism stands somewhere between Kemalism's secularism and Islamism's fundamentalism. Though Moderate Islamism of Erdogan is the first deviation of Erdoganism from Kemalism, it may be because the rise of AKP took place against Turkey's radical Islamists in the post-2001 era. The book reveals Turkey's two obsessions, whether materialized or not. First, to lead the Arab world under the nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire. Tugal writes on page 12: These descriptors referred to his [Erdogans] tenacity and strictness, especially regarding the Israel-Palestine issue: He was widely seen by Arabs as the world's most resolute leader against Israel. Then, Tugal writes on page 14: There were those who spoke, with excitement, about the return of the Ottoman Empire. Taken both statements together, one can find an effort on Erdogans part to have a say in the Arab affairs. This is the second deviation of Erdoganism from Kemalism which had divorced Turkey from its Ottoman predecessor. The second obsession is to join the European Union (EU). Tugal writes on page 88: The [AKP] leaders were also vociferously pro-European and committed to the process of EU accession. The reason for getting this obsession frustrated hitherto is implicit in the sentence written on page 9: Turkey's entry into the European union would serve the interests of the entire Middle East. Unfortunately, this wish was made before asking the EU whether it was ready to welcome a Middle East's representative, with or without the nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire. Tugal thinks that the challenge to the Turkish model has come from authoritarianism rooted in Islam and entered in the model through the practice of liberalization. For instance, Tugal writes on page 3: [T]he successful liberalization in Turkey during the last three decades itself paved the way for Islam's later authoritarian and conservative incarnations. Tugal thinks that letting Islam or Islamic actors mixed with neoliberalisation and democratization was a faulty proposition, as he writes on page 21: [N]eoliberalisation and democratization can proceed together only for a certain time (through the aid of religious forces). When they start to undermine each other, Islamic actors take up more and more non-democratic and non-neoliberal practices (as in Turkey). That is, when neoliberalisation and democratization work together harmoniously, religious forces remain subservient and supportive to them. However, when neoliberalisation and democratization start undermining each other, not only do they get weaker, religious forces also get compatibly stronger and eventually outweigh both of them. Just to add insult to injury, the Arab Spring opened options for a domestic uprising to subvert the democratization aspect of the Turkish model, as Tugal writes on page 178: [T]he Arab uprisings actually dynamited the political liberalism of the Turkish model itself, if not (as yet) its economic liberalism. As the uprisings and regime changes unfolded, Turkey shifted further and further to the political and religious right (and to plain sectarianism), even if in an inconsistent way. The domestic uprising befell in the form of the Gezi Park uprising in Istanbul in 2013. On pages 249 and 250, Tugal writes: The spark of the Gezi uprising was ignited by urban issues [such as greenbelt protection]... [However, the] police brutally cracked down on several dozen protesters who wanted to protect the last green area (Gezi Park) near Taksim, popular determination to save this park initiated the biggest spontaneous revolt in Turkish history. The brutal suppression of the Gezi uprising symbolized the advent of authoritarianism (expressed through the then Prime Minister Erdogans posturing with the Rabia sign, a four-fingered salute, as mentioned on page 2) and with that the symbolic end of the Turkish model took place. Hence, Turkey has been trying to preserve and promote politics-free business of small and medium size but at the cost of surrendering the process of democratization to authoritarianism even if it is justified under authoritarian liberalism, as mentioned on page 4 the third deviance from Kemalism which envisioned political decentralization under Republicanism. To utter dismay of Tugal, Turkey's parliament has approved a constitutional reform package, called the power bill, on January 21 this year. Forwarded by AKP, the package is meant for turning Turkey's parliamentary system into the presidential one in which all power will concentrate in the office of President Erdogan who may extend his term in office until at least 2029. Elected in 2014, President Erdogan is just a ceremonial head of Turkey. However, by mid-April, a referendum may be held to test Populism, another tenet of Kemalism and a yes vote will lead to snap elections to reify constitutional reforms.

The brief rise and precipitous fall of Islamic liberalism Just a few short years ago, the Turkish Model was being hailed across the world. The New York Times gushed that prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) had effectively integrated Islam, democracy, and vibrant economics, making Turkey, according to the International Crisis Group, the envy of the Arab world. And yet, a more recent CNN headline wondered if Erdogan had become a "dictator. In this incisive analysis, Cihan Tugal argues that the problem with this model of Islamic liberalism is much broader and deeper than Erdogans increasing authoritarianism. The problems are inherent in the very model of Islamic liberalism that formed the basis of the AKP's ascendancy and rule since 2002 an intended marriage of neoliberalism and democracy. And this model can also only be understood as a response to regional politics especially as a response to the Iranian Model a marriage of corporatism and Islamic revolution. The Turkish model was a failure in its home country, and the dynamics of the Arab world made it a tough commodity to export. Tugals masterful explication of the demise of Islamic liberalism brings in Egypt and Tunisia, once seen as the most likely followers of the Turkish model, and provides a path-breaking examination of their regimes and Islamist movements, as well as paradigm-shifting accounts of Turkey and Iran.

A forensic analysis of the AKP-Erdoan phenomenon. Ece Temelkuran, New Left In this ambitious book, Tugal compares Turkeys approach to those of Egypt, Iran, and Tunisia by examining how neoliberal economic strategies have played out in each place, paying particular attention to how governments have tried to engage devout Muslim constituencies in the neoliberal project. Foreign Affairs Tuals book fills a critical gap in analysis on Turkeys current political trajectory. Claire Sadar, Muftah A well written and well researched book offering an alternative reading of Turkeys claim to Islamic liberalism as a model for other Islamic countries to emulate. Gorkem Altinors, Progress in Political Economy The idea of the Turkish model has roots going back to the start of the Cold War. Plenty of postmortems have been written for it; no doubt they will continue to be written Tual takes a longer structural view, arguing that the successful liberalization in Turkey during the last three decades itself paved the way for Islams later authoritarian and conservative incarnations. Tackling the question from the left, he writes that the cause of Turkeys crisis was the neoliberal-liberal democratic model (rather than Erdoan the villainor, for that matter, Turkish culture). Hurriyet About the Author Cihan Tugal is the author of Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism. He is an associate professor of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley.